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KINSHIP IN ENTREPRENEUR NETWORKS:  
PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE ASSEMBLY IN AFRICA 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the relationship between structural social capital, resource assembly, and 
firm performance of entrepreneurs in Africa. We posit that social capital primarily composed of 
kinship or family ties helps the entrepreneur to raise resources, but it does so at a cost. Using data 
drawn from small firms in Kampala, Uganda, we explore how shared identity among the 
entrepreneur’s social network moderates this relationship.  A large network contributed a higher 
quantity of resources raised, but at a higher cost when shared identity was high. We discuss the 
implications of these findings for the role of family ties and social capital in resource assembly, 
with an emphasis on developing economies. 
INTRODUCTION 
A prominent literature on family business addresses the formation, governance, and 
importance of family businesses in the global economy. Scholars have examined characteristics 
such as family involvement, control, governance with respect to agency costs and benefits, 
among others (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004; Dyer, 2006; Fiegener, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-
Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007; O’Boyle, Pollack & Rutherford, 2012). 
Scholars are beginning to examine social capital in family firms with respect to its creation 
(Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007; Khavul, Bruton & Wood, 2009) and impact on firm 
performance (Dyer, 2006). Social capital and social networks facilitate the acquisition of 
resources (Kotha & George, 2012) which are utilized to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Baker & Nelson, 2005), and impact performance and value creation (George, 2005).  
  3 
Social capital and networks are particularly important to small, family firms who tend to 
draw heavily on family or kinship ties for resource acquisition especially at the nascent firm 
formation phase (Arregle et al., 2007; Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Greve & Salaff, 2003; Khayesi 
& George, 2011; Maurer & Ebers, 2006). Defined loosely, kinship ties include relationships by 
blood and marriage (Peredo, 2003; Stewart, 2003) and comprise one’s spouse, parents, children, 
and other relatives like siblings and in-laws (Kotha & George, 2012; Renzulli, Aldrich & Moody, 
2000). In African societies, kin relations are extensive and include nuclear as well as extended 
families (Khavul et al., 2009; Smith, 2009) numbering sometimes into hundreds or even the size 
of a tribe (Mbiti, 1969).  
Despite increasing research on social capital, family firms, and entrepreneurship research 
in general, developing countries continue to receive little research attention in comparison to 
developed economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Obloj, 2008; Khavul et al., 2009). Our study draws 
from literature on family firms, kinship and social capital to examine the influence of family and 
kin-induced social capital on entrepreneurs’ resource accumulation efforts in an under-researched 
context, that of a developing economy. Whereas the positive contribution of social capital and 
networks to resource acquisition is widely acknowledged, there is growing theoretical recognition 
of risks of social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002); for example, the cost of capital associated with 
raising resources from the social network (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002), the hindrance of 
new information flowing into the network, and problems of free-riding from network members 
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). This cost implies that maintaining a vibrant network that yields 
resources also requires investment of one's time, effort and resources in meeting the demands of 
the network members. Such risks can be detrimental to small firms who rely heavily on family 
and kinship ties.  
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We examine the aggregate cost of raising resources which includes the cost of social 
capital comprising of interest paid on money that is borrowed (Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Gillespie, 
2002) plus the cost of maintaining the network. We use our empirical research to draw 
implications for small, family firms because they rely heavily on or involve kin relations in their 
social networks (Arregle et al., 2007; Chrisman, Chua & Steier, 2005). The fact that “network 
ties among family create constraints, as well as opportunities for entrepreneurship” (Steier, Chua 
& Chrisman, 2009) makes our research particularly applicable to family firms whose social 
capital can generate resources as well as increase costs of maintaining the network thus affecting 
the aggregate cost of raising resources. Unlike the Western concept of “family” comprising close, 
immediate relatives, such as first cousins, a family in Africa comprises kin members from 
extended families (Khavul et al., 2009; Ayisi, 1979; Mbiti, 1969).  
Our empirical research is conducted in Uganda, an African country. This African setting, 
a developing economy context, adds insight into theories that have been developed 
predominantly in high-income economies by reflecting on a contextual constraint of social 
capital. Additionally, there remains limited management research on emerging economies, 
especially in Africa (Khavul et al., 2009; Bruton, Ahlstrom & Obloj, 2008; George, McGahan & 
Prabhu, 2012; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Entrepreneurs operate within settings characterized by 
multi-ethnic or cultural diversity (Marris, 1971; Mbiti, 1969) and high dependency
1
 reflecting the 
proportion of individuals that do not work (World Bank, 2007). High dependency implies that 
entrepreneurs not only pursue profit-making goals but also have to satisfy needs of dependents 
                                                 
1
 The total dependency ratio in developing countries is much higher than that of developed economies. For example, 
in 2005, the total dependency ratio in least developed countries was 80% while that of North America was 49%, 
Northern Europe 51%, and Southern Europe 48%. In Africa, East Africa had the highest dependency ratio (90%) 
compared to the other parts of Africa (Western: 86%, Central: 83%, Northern: 61%, and Southern: 58%.) Even 
within East Africa, Uganda’s total dependency ratio was the highest (108%) compared to Kenya (83%), Tanzania 
(91), Rwanda (82%), and Burundi (79) (United Nations Population Division, 2008). 
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including community welfare objectives. High dependence on other community members is 
likely to affect resource assembly efforts, who often find that they have to meet the social and 
financial needs of community members, thus limiting their ability to accumulate resources in 
order to invest in their business ventures. 
The findings inform organizational and family business research in the following areas: 
(a) the importance of analyzing the cost implications of acquiring resources using one’s social 
capital, particularly from family members or kin relations, (b) the need to go beyond analyzing 
firm performance effects arising from amount of resources assembled, to examining performance 
implications associated with the cost of raising resources, and (c) the implications of cost 
associated with the extent of involvement of family members in an entrepreneur’s network.  
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Social capital theory assumes that economic action is embedded in social relations 
(Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). The premise is that networks of relationships are a resource 
that facilitate as well as constrain social and economic activities and outcomes (Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Although there is no universally accepted 
definition of social capital, researchers agree that social capital is a valuable resource that is 
embedded in a network of relationships, and facilitates the realization of other resources for 
individuals and/or organizations (Adler & Kwon, 2000; Coleman 1990).  We define social capital 
as a focal actor’s (individual or group) network of relationships, including the structural, 
relational and cognitive dimensions that may facilitate and/or constrain its actions and outcomes.  
Network Size and Quantity of Resources Raised 
Network size reflects the capacity of an individual’s social network (Burt, 2000), and is 
made of first order network contacts of that individual (Greve & Salaff, 2003). We focus on first 
order contacts because benefits from second and third order contacts accrue to the entrepreneur 
  6 
through the first order contacts. The size of one’s network reflects the extent of resources that that 
individual can access (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Kotha & George, 2012). Therefore, we expect 
the amount of resources to increase with an increasing network size. In the case of family firms, 
their social capital comprises, to a large extent, family members (Arregle et al., 2007). Including 
family and kin in one’s network contributes to an increased network size particularly in contexts 
where definitions of kinship extend beyond the nuclear family and immediate relatives such as in 
Africa (Khavul et al., 2009; Mbiti, 1969; Smith, 2009). In addition to being a committed source 
of capital and other resources, family members and kinship relations are strategic in that they are 
a source of connections to weak ties (Arregle et al., 2007: Stewart, 2003). 
Network size facilitates acquisition of resources in different ways. First, having a large 
network increases the possibility of having a large number of weaker connections among network 
members (Burt, 1997, 2000) providing improved chances of receiving non-redundant information 
and resources. Second, having a large network facilitates resource acquisition by increasing the 
number of sources of resources, and resource accessibility (Uzzi, 1999). Compared to a small 
network, a large network gives an entrepreneur more chances of finding someone who is likely to 
be supportive or to provide resources. Indeed, kin relations enhance the size of one’s network 
especially in family firms characterized by strong family social capital (FSC). As the size of an 
entrepreneur’s network increases, we expect the amount of resources raised to increase. We, 
however, note that this relationship will be weaker in high dependency contexts, where a majority 
of the network members may not be able to contribute financial resources given that they do not 
have an income, when compared to low dependency contexts such as most Western countries. 
Hypothesis 1: In networks dominated by kin, the size of a focal entrepreneur’s network will be 
positively related to the quantity of resources raised through the network. 
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Network Size and Aggregate Cost of Raising Resources 
In raising resources, entrepreneurs incur certain costs which may affect their resource 
accumulation efforts. Often studied is the interest paid for finances received or the cost of capital 
(Uzzi, 1999; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). Aggregate cost of raising resources, however, goes beyond 
cost of capital in order to maintain one’s network. Arregle et al. (2007) point out that a strong 
FSC may bring about high maintenance costs for family firms. Additionally, dysfunctional family 
realities or characteristics such as norms may deter the positive effects of FSC (Arregle et al., 
2007). In Africa, such norms may arise from cultural systems that are costly to entrepreneurs. 
Costs of maintaining a network can be largely explained by the cultural value systems that go 
with kinship. Societal norms that govern the roles of kinship could generate costs to a business; 
for example, family obligations that exert pressure on entrepreneurs to support members of their 
extended families. Family obligations comprise one of the forms of socioemotional wealth whose 
preservation is valued by family firms irrespective of its negative effects on firm performance 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Such obligations may increase agency costs due to emotional 
attachment between the principal and the agent (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001; 
Schulze et al., 2001).  
In Africa, maintenance costs may take the form of using entrepreneurs’ financial 
resources to fulfill social obligations or demands placed on them by their social relations 
(Kiggundu, 2002). Responding to community demands or fulfilling family and social obligations 
using firm resources may be due to entrepreneurs’ altruistic motives (Schulze et al., 2001), and 
may increase agency costs. Such costs are further heightened by a high dependency ratio 
implying a greater proportion of a non-working population that exerts pressure on entrepreneurs 
to fulfill their financial needs using firm resources. 
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The kinship system in Africa exerts pressure on individuals to provide for the needs and 
obligations of other kin members (Ayisi, 1979; Mbiti, 1969). In East Africa, demands from one’s 
social relations, particularly kin, may include financial contributions to community projects, 
paying school fees or medical expenses, and providing for financial expenses of social events like 
weddings and dowry payment (Luke, Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2004; Mbiti, 1969). Such demands 
are necessitated by the fact that a good proportion of the population does not work and therefore 
does not have an income. Because of fear of consequences of non-conformity to the kinship 
normative value of “sharing without reckoning” for instance losing legitimacy, status, and a 
following, entrepreneurs are forced to comply with demands from their social relations(Stewart, 
2003). Additionally, family firms in the cousin consortium phase of ownership where cousins 
“can claim an owner-like control on the firm” (Smith, 2009) are faced with claims for money, 
resources and other business assets by kin relations hence enhancing costs to a firm. Using firm 
resources to fulfill family and kinship-related demands and allowing a cousin consortium kind of 
ownership to exist in one’s business may heighten the cost of maintaining one’s network, hence 
interfering with the performance of firms (Stewart, 2003). We expect the cost of maintaining a 
network to increase relative to the size of the network, particularly in an African context where 
one’s network is dominated by kin. 
In Africa, the kinship system governs social relationships and connects an individual to 
several family members. Relationships in this context stretch far and wide to the extent that “each 
individual is a brother or sister, father or mother, grandmother or grandfather, or cousin, or 
brother-in-law, uncle or aunt or something else, to everybody else” (Mbiti, 1969: 104). This wide 
sense of the meaning of kinship implies that African entrepreneurs are likely to have large social 
networks comprising largely of kin members. Thus, whereas kin increase the size of an 
entrepreneur’s network, this increase implies an increased cost of maintaining the network. 
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Therefore as the entrepreneur’s network expands, likewise, we expect the cost of maintaining a 
network to increase relative to the network size. Therefore, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: In networks dominated by kin, the size of a focal entrepreneur’s network will be 
positively related to aggregate cost of raising resources through the network. 
 
The Role of Shared Identity 
Shared identity in a network reflects commonality and cohesion among members in the 
network. The commonality may be based on personal or social identification (Hite & Hesterly, 
2001), for instance, culture and norms (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005), professions (Maurer & Ebers, 
2006), shared codes and language (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) or bounded solidarity (Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). This commonality is a guiding factor in the exchange of resources in 
identity-based networks, and may facilitate or hinder resource accumulation. Often, identity-
based networks comprise of dense, cohesive networks of embedded ties (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). 
The guiding principle of shared identity networks, particularly bounded solidarity, is the 
support of individual goals of group members. Shared identity creates goodwill and mutual 
understanding among network members; which, in turn, encourages network members to support 
each other. Thus, through shared understanding, shared identity facilitates social exchange and 
distributive justice (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) thus enabling the exchange of resources 
among firms. In relation to costs, embedding transactions in social relations promotes shared 
values and beliefs for parties involved which, in turn, helps to reduce the cost of capital or 
interest paid on borrowed finances (Uzzi, 1999). Hence, entrepreneurs often make use of their 
relatives as sources of start-up capital because of lower costs of capital compared to the 
professional money providers (Stewart, 2003).  
The willingness of relatives to provide finances at a lower cost can be attributed to shared 
identity arising from common social identity. However, shared identity that is based on shared 
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norms may create “excessive expectations of obligatory behavior and possibly result in problems 
of free riding and unwillingness to experiment beyond the network” (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005: 
153). Thus, coupled with high dependency of kin relations on entrepreneurs who are often 
perceived as wealthy individuals in Africa, such norms imply that entrepreneurs have to incur 
heavy costs in fulfilling demands from their network members. The high dependency ratio in 
Uganda would seem to imply that entrepreneurs may not benefit from the low costs of capital 
since most of their network contacts may not have an income, and consequently little money to 
lend the entrepreneurs. Instead, entrepreneurs would incur high costs maintaining these network 
members. Thus, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 3: In networks dominated by kin, the greater the shared identity between a focal 
entrepreneur and his/her network contacts, the higher the quantity of resources 
raised through the network. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In networks dominated by kin, the greater the shared identity between a focal 
entrepreneur and his/her network contacts, the higher the aggregate cost of 
raising resources through the network. 
 
Social capital features and dimensions are likely interrelated (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998), 
and some social capital variables reinforce or amplify the effects of other social capital variables. 
In this regard, we propose that shared identity, a measure of cognitive social capital, will amplify 
the effects of structural social capital on resource accumulation. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
present cognitive social capital as a facilitator of resource acquisition by providing “access to 
people and their information.” Moreover, Hite & Hesterly (2001) have argued that an individual 
(the focal entrepreneur, in our case) achieves advantages from his/her network ties because of the 
identity of the ties. Further, Maurer and Ebers (2006) reiterate that shared identity (language and 
meanings) facilitates accessibility to information and resources of network ties. Overall, 
therefore, shared identity facilitates accessibility to the resources of the social relations that form 
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the size of an entrepreneur’s network. We expect shared identity to amplify the effects of network 
size on amount of resources raised through the network. 
In relation to costs, shared values and beliefs among networks help to reduce the cost of 
financing (Uzzi, 1999) hence encouraging entrepreneurs to look for finances from their family 
members and friends rather than professional money providers or financial institutions (Stewart, 
2003). On the contrary, high dependency along with free-riding behavior will imply heavy costs 
of maintaining a network. Thus, if an entrepreneur has a large network size, greater social 
cohesion due to shared identity will likely amplify the cost effects of network size, especially in 
the African context as described earlier. Therefore, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis 5: In networks dominated by kin, the relation between network size and quantity of 
resources raised through the network is moderated by shared identity such that 
this relation is positive when shared identity is high and negative when shared 
identity is low. 
 
Hypothesis 6: In networks dominated by kin, the relation between network size and aggregate 
cost of raising resources through the network is moderated by shared identity 
such that this relation is positive when shared identity is high and negative 
when shared identity is low. 
 
Resource Accumulation and Firm Performance 
Resource accumulation is a function of the resources acquired by a firm (resource 
inflows) less those being drained from the firm in form of costs of acquiring resources (resource 
outflows) (Knott et al., 2003). Whereas resources acquired facilitate firm performance, the costs 
associated with raising those resources reduce the amount of resources available for firm 
activities. In effect, this reduction of available resources may limit firm performance. Indeed, the 
relationship between resources and firm performance has been widely researched (Coleman, 
2007; Mishina, Pollock & Porac, 2004). However, lacking in these studies is an analysis of the 
influence of the cost of raising those resources on firm performance, and this from a social-
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capital perspective. Of course, from an accounting point of view, such theorizing is self-evident; 
however, these social costs to which we are referring affect the entrepreneur in the future (so they 
are not accounted for in the short term, if accounted at all). We therefore posit that: 
Hypothesis 7: The greater the amount of resources raised by an entrepreneur through the 
network, the higher will be the firm performance. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The greater the aggregate cost of raising resources through the network, 
the lower will be the firm performance. 
 
SAMPLE AND METHOD 
We collected data on 242 small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in the garment-making, 
and information and communication technology (ICT) industries in Kampala, Uganda. Of these, 
data from 188 entrepreneurs was usable for this study. The participants consisted of indigenous 
Ugandans of diverse ethnicity; to ensure maximum variability on the variables of interest, and to 
have a control group, we also sampled entrepreneurs of Asian origin. Such diversity, coupled 
with variation in firm size yielded variation in social aspects of our study (e.g., social networks 
and the fulfillment of social obligations). We account for industry differences across a dynamic, 
high technology (ICT) and a low technology industry (garment-making). We used a structured 
questionnaire to collect data through face-to-face interviews. Key measures on our questionnaire 
were derived from literature to the extent possible. We used six post-graduate students at 
Makerere University Business School in Kampala, Uganda, to review the initial questionnaire 
and pre-tested it on 15 entrepreneurs in Kampala and revised it accordingly. 
In developed economies, there are often lists and directories of businesses registered in a 
geographic area or industry. As one might expect, the Ugandan authorities had no such data. 
Because of the lack of a listing of firms, we used industry associations and university sources to 
construct our initial list. A follow-up, telephone call and physical visits to verify the existence of 
  13 
these firms revealed that the existing lists were not up-to-date; many firms were non-existent, and 
others could not be found at the indicated addresses. Furthermore, there were firms clustered in 
different parts of Kampala that did not appear on any of the lists. Because of the inability to 
establish the exact number of firms in our population, we visited all the firms in our population 
and conducted interviews with all who accepted to be interviewed, yielding a total of 128 
garment-making entrepreneurs and 114 ICT entrepreneurs. All 242 surveys were completed in 
face-to-face interviews. Each interview took between 45 and 90 minutes. Overall, it took us five 
months, between our initial contact in our study area and the completion of data gathering.  
Measures 
We used several dependent, independent and control variables to explore the relationship 
between structural social capital, resource accumulation, and firm performance.  
Dependent variables. We used three dependent variables to explore the relationship 
between structural social capital, resource accumulation and firm performance: Quantity of 
resources raised, aggregate cost of raising resources, and firm performance. 
Quantity of resources raised was measured as the total amount of money (in millions of 
Ugandan shillings; 1 USD = approx. 2000 Uganda Shillings) that the entrepreneur had received 
in the past year from different contacts in his/her network. We asked respondents to indicate the 
amount of money received from different contacts then added it up to get the total amount of 
finances raised. Such resource generator techniques are used to gather information on resources 
received and resource providers (Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005).  
Aggregate cost of raising resources was measured as the total amount of money (in 
millions of Ugandan shillings) that the entrepreneur had incurred in the process of raising both 
financial and non-financial resources for the firm. These included interest paid, and money spent 
on network contacts, for example, business lunches and dinners, and social activities expenses 
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such as weddings and funerals. We asked respondents to indicate the amount of money they had 
spent on each of these expenses then added it up to get the total costs. To minimize problems 
associated with recall, respondents were asked to indicate expenses incurred in the past year. 
Firm performance was measured using an objective financial performance measure, the 
volume of sales (in millions of Ugandan shillings) achieved by the entrepreneur’s firm in the past 
year. Sales is described as a single, most preferred measure of firm performance (Delmar et al., 
2003). We used the log-transformed value of sales given the large variance and skewed 
distribution. 
Independent variables. We used network size as an independent variable: We measured 
network size as the total volume of the respondent's social network (Burt, 2000). We asked 
respondents to indicate by category of relationship the number of people they interact with 
regularly for resources for their businesses. This study focused on egocentric networks; hence, 
our interest in the first order contacts of respondents (Greve & Salaff, 2003).  
We explored both direct and moderating effects of shared identity in this study. We 
measured shared identity using three statements reflecting the extent to which respondents have 
similar cultural beliefs and value systems, and language with their network contacts. We modeled 
this scale of shared identity (α = 0.69) after Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998), borrowing concepts 
from the social psychology literature on social identity. 
Control variables. We included three firm-level control variables (industry, firm size and 
firm age) and one entrepreneur-related variable (religion). We chose these firm demographic 
features as control variables consistent with previous research (Delmar et al. 2003), which 
indicates that these firm characteristics influence firm performance. To control for any industry 
effects on network characteristics and resource accessibility, we measured industry using a 
dummy variable coded as 1 for garment-making entrepreneurs and 0 for ICT entrepreneurs. To 
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control for firm size effects, we measured firm size as the number of full-time paid employees in 
2007. Consistent with previous social capital studies (Saparito, Chen & Sapienza, 2004; Yli-
Renko et al., 2001), we measured firm age as the number of years since the founding of the firm.  
We included religion as a control variable in examining the relationship between 
structural social capital on the one hand, and finances raised and cost of raising finances on the 
other hand. We measured this variable categorically (using k – 1 dummy variables for being 
Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and No Religion). We included religion because 
it is an important determinant of the extent to which an individual gives financial support to other 
members of the community (Mbiti, 1969) as well as for the fact that it proxies for many social 
and cultural-level variables (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006). Following this line of thinking, 
we expected that an entrepreneur’s religious heritage has an important role in determining how 
much such an entrepreneur will give to community members in an effort to fulfilling social 
obligations, and how much he/she will avail for firm activities. 
Model Specification Tests 
There is a potential endogeneity issue between the social capital variables and the 
dependent variables in the model due to possible omitted variables and simultaneous causality 
(i.e., the modeled independent variables may be caused by the dependent variables). For example, 
entrepreneurs who have raised more capital may consequently grow their network size. Thus, 
simultaneous causality may bring about correlation between an explanatory variable and the error 
term (Bascle, 2008; Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993) and thereby render the estimates inconsistent 
(Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart & Lalive, 2010). In order to resolve the endogeneity problem and 
ensure that our estimates are consistent, we used an instrumental variable (referred to hereafter as 
IV) regression method (Bascle, 2008). To use IV methods we had to find exogenous variables 
that we could use as instruments. Our literature search yielded two instruments: The size of the 
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immediate family (total number of spouse/s, children, parents, and siblings), and a scale of social 
participation (α = 0.69), composed of four items reflecting the extent to which the respondent 
participated in social activities before founding the firm.  
We also included total kin as an instrument because we expected it to correlate with 
network size. Thus, the characteristics and influence of the network largely emanate from the 
influence of kinship or family ties. We measured total kin as a count of all the kin (immediate and 
extended family), both resource-providing and non-resource providing, in the entrepreneur’s 
network. We also included the demographic characteristics as instruments: gender (1 for males 
and 0 for females), marital status (1 for married and 0 for unmarried), race (1 for Africans and 0 
for Asians), level of education (1 for respondents who had attained some level of schooling and 0 
otherwise), age (respondent’s absolute chronological age in years) and tribe (1 for Muganda and 
0 otherwise). All these variables are exogenous in the sense that they are beyond the choice of the 
individuals and cannot be influenced by the other variables in the equation.  
In addition, we included the following exogenous variables (that were available from our 
data) as instruments: Entrepreneur’s prior work experience (1 for respondents who had done 
formal jobs previously and 0 for those with no formal jobs), entrepreneur’s parents business 
experience (1 if the respondent’s parents had business experience before the respondent started 
his/her business venture and 0 otherwise), and the individual income (in millions of Ugandan 
Shillings). We included all control variables as instruments (Antonakis et al., 2010). Also, by 
including all possible sources that correlate with the dependent variable, we anticipate that the 
model’s estimates will be consistent, even if instruments might not be fully exogenous. Because 
we had multiple dependent variables being predicted by the same set of independent and control 
variables, as well as several equations, we estimated the model using three stage least squares 
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(3SLS) (Zellner & Theil, 1962). This is a full-information IV regression method which ensures 
the efficient analysis of all equations in the model (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993).  
RESULTS 
Our sample consisted mainly of very small and young firms, with a mean firm size of 3 
employees and an average organizational age of 5 years old (Table 1). Majority of the sampled 
firms had a large proportion of kin in their networks averaging 70%; i.e. social networks of the 
respondents were dominated by family members or kin. For correlations and descriptive statistics 
refer to Table 1. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
We present results of the IV regression analysis (Table 2) from the simultaneous 
estimation of three equations where the dependent variables (DVs) were: a) Quantity of resources 
raised, b) aggregate cost of raising resources, and c) firm performance. Additionally, we present 
results of the regression analysis using the OLS estimator for comparative purposes (where social 
capital is assumed to be exogenous). It is evident in Table 2 that although the OLS estimator has 
higher explanatory power of the variance in firm performance (R
2
 of .10 versus .05 for the 3SLS 
estimator), the 3SLS estimator yielded a higher number of significant estimates compared to the 
OLS estimator. For example, for the firm performance model, both main effects yielded 
significant results with the 3SLS estimator (β = .11, p < .01 for quantity of resources raised, and β 
= -1.17 p < .01 for cost of raising resources) but only one significant main effect, cost of raising 
resources, with OLS (β = -.54, p < .01). Similarly, there were two significant control variables 
with 3SLS but only one significant control variable with OLS. Indeed, a Hausman test for OLS 
versus 3SLS showed a significant difference for cost of raising resources (t = -2.00, p < .05) and 
amount of resources raised (t = 21.32, p < .001). The significant difference between the OLS and 
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3SLS shows that the social capital variables are endogenous, thus justifying the use of IV 
regression (Antonakis et al., 2010). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
To ensure that the 3SLS estimator was consistent vis-à-vis the 2SLS estimator, we 
conducted a Hausman test to determine whether the estimates differed (if they do, then the 2SLS 
estimator must be retained). The Chi-square for all equations in our model was not significant 
(2[70] = 24.98, p > .05). Similarly, a Hausman test for individual equations yielded non-
significant Chi-square for the cost model (2[11] = 3.25, p > .05) and finances raised model 
(2[11] = 3.34, p > .05). These results show that the estimates for the two models (2SLS and 
3SLS) are not significantly different; we thus retained the more efficient estimator, 3SLS, which 
was also consistent. We performed a Hansen-Sargan’s over-identification test; results revealed 
that the instruments were valid (2[48] = 56.88, p > 0.05), and over-identifying restrictions 
indicated that this model was tenable (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007). 
Among the control variables used, firm size yielded significant results across the three 
models. Firm size had significant positive relationships with quantity of resources raised (β = 
3.86, p < .01), aggregate cost of raising resources (β = .55, p < .01), and firm performance (β = 
.29, p < .05). In addition to firm size, firm age had marginal significant relationship with 
aggregate cost of raising resources (β = -.13, p < .10) whereas industry had significant 
relationship to firm performance (β = -1.41, p < .05). One religion categorical variable (being 
Hindu with respect to being Protestant) yielded positive significant relationships with quantity of 
resources raised (β = 73.65, p < .01) and aggregate cost of raising resources (β = 5.24, p < .01). 
Next, we report the direct effects of the key variables (network size and shared identity) 
on the quantity of resources raised, and the aggregate cost of raising resources. We then move on 
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to report the direct effects of the quantity of resources raised, and the aggregate cost of raising 
resources on firm performance. Note, because of the presence of an interaction effect, the main 
effects are actually not interpretable as main effects usually are because these effects are not 
constant and depend on the level of the moderator (Aiken & West, 1991).  When holding Shared 
Identity constant at its mean, Network Size yielded positive significant relationships with 
quantity of resources raised (β =  .27, p < .05) and aggregate cost of raising resources (β = .04, p 
< 0.05), providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. As for, shared identity, it 
showed no relationship with quantity of resources raised (β = -.12, p > 0.05), and aggregate cost 
of raising resources (β = .44, p > .10), showing lack of support for hypotheses 3 and 4 
respectively. 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 postulated direct effects of quantity of resources raised, and aggregate 
cost of raising resources on firm performance. As hypothesized, the quantity of resources raised 
yielded a positive significant relationship with firm performance (β = .11, p < 0.01), whereas the 
aggregate cost of raising resources had a negative significant relationship with firm performance 
(β = -1.17, p < 0.01), supporting hypotheses 7 and 8 respectively. To better understand how 
quantity and cost of resources affect firm performance, and to provide a measure of effects, and 
given that the DV is in logs, we can interpret the relation between the independent variables (IVs) 
and the DVs as follows: When quantity of resources is raised by 1 unit, firm performance 
increases by 11%. However, when cost of resources changes by 1 unit, firm performance drops 
by 117%. Note, a Wald test indicated that the coefficients of the cost of resources and quantity of 
resources are significantly different (2[1] = 11.63, p < 0.001). 
To test the moderating effect of shared identity on the relationship between structural 
social capital and resource accumulation, we examine the interaction effects of shared identity 
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and network size. As expected, the interaction between shared identity and network size was 
positive and highly significant for quantity of resources raised (β = .54, p < .01), and aggregate 
cost of raising resources (β = .08, p < .01). To probe this interaction, we plotted the interaction 
effects graphs for high and low values of shared identity (Figures 1 and 2) and also tested the 
simple slopes. Both the regression analysis and interaction graphs support hypotheses 5 and 6. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FAMILY FIRMS 
70% of the entrepreneurs’ networks in our sample were kin and family members. Hence, 
we discuss our study results and draw implications for family firms. We set out to examine the 
moderating effect of shared identity on the relationship between structural social capital (network 
size) and resource accumulation (quantity of resources raised, and the aggregate cost of raising 
resources). We further investigated the effect of resource accumulation on firm performance. The 
results reveal that shared identity moderates the relationship between network size and resource 
accumulation, with the interaction model yielding highly significant results as hypothesized. 
Finally, as postulated, the amount of resources raised significantly increased firm performance 
whereas the cost of raising resources significantly reduced firm performance. 
Our findings support the moderating effects for quantity of resources raised and aggregate 
cost of raising resources when shared identity is high. Hypothesis 5 which stipulated a positive 
relationship between network size and quantity of resources raised when shared identity was high 
was supported. Likewise, hypothesis 6 which stipulated a positive relationship between network 
size and cost of raising resources when shared identity was high was supported. Previous 
entrepreneurship studies (Kotha & George, 2012; Renzulli & Aldrich, 2005; Renzulli et al., 
2000) have also found positive relationship between network size and resources accessibility and 
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acquisition. The finding that shared identity moderates the relationship between structural social 
capital and resource accumulation is a step forward in unearthing conditions under which 
structural social capital may affect resource accumulation positively and negatively.  
The evidence further supports our hypotheses on the relationship between the amount of 
resources raised and cost of raising those resources, and firm performance. Our findings reveal 
that more resources lead to higher firm performance whereas higher costs reduce firm 
performance, and confirm prior studies (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Coleman, 2007; Mishina et al, 
2004). Indeed, our analysis of marginal effects reveals that the cost of raising resources has far 
greater negative effects on firm performance in comparison to the positive effects of resources 
raised. These cost effects do outweigh the positive effects of resources raised. This finding on 
negative performance may serve as a further empirical evidence of Gomez-Mejia et al., (2007) 
proposition that poor performance by family firms may be attributed to their willingness to 
preserve their socio-emotional wealth irrespective of its negative consequences to the firm. 
Clearly, one of the objectives of family business research is to explain performance differences 
among family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005). O’Boyle et al. (2012) meta-analysis found no 
relationship between family involvement and firm performance when moderated by public versus 
private firms, firm size and culture. Based on our study finding a negative relationship between 
cost of raising resources and performance, we suggest that family business researchers this cost 
of raising resources as a moderator/mediator explore when studying performance differences 
among family firms. There is therefore need for family firm researchers to examine not only the 
amount of resources raised through an entrepreneur’s network but also the cost implications of 
raising resources, in order to explain performance differences among family firms. 
The emerging economy context, especially African economies, is gaining importance as 
these countries take more active roles in the global economy, development, and governance. 
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Recent calls for research highlight entrepreneurship as a crucial tool to engender prosperity and 
improve social and economic well-being (e.g., Bruton et al., 2008; George, McGahan & Prabhu, 
2012).  Our findings extend our empirical knowledge of the drivers of performance and survival 
of family firms in this context (Khavul et al., 2009). Equally important, this study provides fresh 
insight into how an entrepreneurs’ social network could also impose significant costs. For family 
firms, these costs may be attributed to kinship and its associated family obligations (Stewart, 
2003) arising from the heavy involvement of family members. We add to the emergent 
discussions in the management literature of how FSC can contribute positively and negatively to 
firm performance in an entrepreneurial setting in an emerging context. 
The findings are of practical relevance to entrepreneurs, especially family firms. 
Entrepreneurs wishing to achieve higher performance vis-à-vis the resources raised ought to aim 
at maximizing resources raised from networks while reducing the associated costs. Our study 
reveals that within the context of an emerging economy, such a performance target requires a 
combination of a large network and lower shared identity with network contacts--our study 
showed that negative effects of costs outweigh positive effects of resources raised by far--in order 
to improve performance through minimizing costs. Indeed, this negative performance effect of 
costs in family firms in Africa can be attributed to the constraining role of extended family ties 
resulting from family obligations, opportunism and agency (Khavul et al., 2009). Thus, our 
advice to family firm entrepreneurs is that they carefully consider network members with lesser 
shared identity. In essence, this means that family firms ought to include more non-family ties in 
their social networks in order to reduce the costs of raising resources. 
Overall, our study reveals that the configuration of an entrepreneur’s structural social 
capital can help us understand both positive and negative contributions of structural social capital 
to resource accumulation especially for family firms. By engaging the debate on the negative 
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contributions of social capital, this study supports scholars (Adler & Kwon, 2002) who have 
argued for the need to go beyond over-emphasizing the positive attributes of social capital to 
presenting a balanced analysis of both its risks and benefits. Within the Ugandan setting, the 
results of this study reveal the importance of shared identity as a moderator of the relationship 
between structural social capital and resource accumulation variables. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
A collective, African communal context adds to family business research knowledge of 
how social networks could be a benefit that comes at a great cost especially when entrepreneurs 
rely heavily on family members. Nonetheless, our study does have its limitations. First, we used 
cross-sectional data in our study. Given that social capital is a phenomenon which can change 
over time, our results do not capture this temporal effect. Future studies could attempt a 
longitudinal examination of whether the contribution of structural social capital to resource 
accumulation changes over time, and under what circumstances such changes may occur. Second, 
we utilized one measure of cost, total cost, in our study. Future studies could disaggregate this 
cost by investigating the relative contribution of different types of network members such as 
immediate kin, extended kin, non-kin and other members of the network to cost rather than look 
at the cost of the network as a whole.  
This study was conducted in an urban setting in a single country. An effort was made to 
include indigenous Ugandans from different ethnic groups as well as Asians and other non-
Ugandan entrepreneurs. Future studies, however, can benefit by including both a rural and urban 
sample within the same study so as to investigate whether social capital of entrepreneurs (and the 
related costs) differs based on the context – rural or urban. Although this data was collected in a 
developing country context, we believe that the results of this study are applicable to other 
contexts too. Our model includes contextual factors such as race, gender, industry and firm age 
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which make it possible to compare results across different contexts and countries. Again, a 
comparison of results from different countries and organizational contexts is necessary to explain 
cost-related and resource-related performance differences across firms in different contexts, and 
to further validate our model. These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that the insights 
gained by our findings have made a contribution to management and entrepreneurship research, 
particularly understanding how social capital enhances and limits resource assembly. This study 
has shown that it is important to take into account not only the amount of resources assembled, 
but also the cost of raising resources, in order to improve firm performance. 
CONCLUSION 
This study examined the moderating role of shared identity on the relationship between 
structural social capital (network size) and quantity of resources raised, and the aggregate cost of 
raising resources. We further examined the effect of resources raised and the cost of raising those 
resources on firm performance. Results show that shared identity interacts with network size to 
facilitate resource accumulation, particularly the quantity of resources raised and the aggregate 
cost of raising resources. The findings show that the interaction effect of network size and shared 
identity significantly increases quantity and cost of raising resources. Ultimately, the resources 
raised and aggregate cost of raising those resources determines performance differences among 
entrepreneurial firms, especially family firms. The key contribution of this study lies in 
advancing our understanding of situations under which structural social capital might benefit or 
detract entrepreneurs’ efforts to assemble resources to build and maintain a viable venture. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Firm perf.
a
 2.02 3.68          
2. Agg. cost of resources 2.54 4.70 -.04         
3. Quant. of raised resources  13.06 33.29 .02 .89*        
4. Industry
d
 .53 .50 -.15* -.31* -.29*       
5. Firm size 3.25 4.47 .17* .69* .66* -.28*      
6. Firm age 5.41 4.50 .01 .10 .09 .34* .25*     
7. Network size 43.53 27.73 -.01 .20* .11 .17* .21* .24*    
8. Shared identity 4.02 1.47 .02 -.09 .05 .40* -.05 .15* .07   
9. Total kin 69.93 16.84 .00 .05 .01 -.15* -.02 -.12 .19* -.27*  
10. Male
b
 .62 .49 .08 .15* .14* -.46* .05 -.21* .07 -.23* .11 
11. Marital status
d
 .69 .46 -.09 .11 .09 .16* .09 .20* .22* .11 .09 
12. African
c
 .96 .20 -.15* -.30* -.43* .22* -.33* -.11 .12 -.01 .08 
13. Education
d
 .97 .18 .11 .08 .07 -.17* .13* -.01 .17* -.02 .00 
14. Work experience
d
 .52 .50 .10 .16* .16* -.15* .17* -.04 .25* -.09 .13 
15. Entrepreneur’s age 32.48 7.35 -.04 .38* .32* -.03 .28* .36* .21* -.10 .05 
16. Parents’ bus. exp. .30 .46 .09 .05 .14* .10 .18* .15* .16* .27* .01 
17. Individual income 1.54 1.02 .12 .34* .45* -.30* .38* .09 .09 -.03 .15* 
18. Social participation 4.86 1.13 .11 -.03 -.01 .21* .09 .27* .30* .16* -.31* 
19. Size of immediate fam. 10.85 5.16 .02 .02 -.03 .28* .05 .22* .62* .21* .22* 
20. Tribe
d
 .67 .47 -.13* -.08 -.15* .15* -.18* -.02 .03 .04 -.02 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
10. Male
b
           
11. Marital status
d
 -.25*          
12. African
c
 -.12 .04         
13. Education
d
 .10 -.02 -.04        
14. Work experience
d
 .31* -.06 -.01 .14*       
15. Entrepreneur’s age .05 .25* -.04 .09 .19*      
16. Parents’ bus. exp. -.02 .01 -.13* .07 .19* .01     
17. Individual income .21* .04 -.52* .10 .17* .17* .10    
18. Social participation -.23* .18* .10 .11 .03 .08 .17* -.07   
19. Size of immediate fam. -.04 .35* .16* .01 .14* .19* .10 -.04 .17*  
20. Tribe
d
 -.08 .06 .31* -.13* -.07 .04 -.11 -.18* -.00 .05 
a
 This firm performance variable (sales) is log transformed. 
b
 Male=1 (0=female) 
c
 African=1 (0=Asian) 
d
 These are dummy variables coded as: industry (1 if garment-making and 0 otherwise i.e. ICT), marital status (1 if married and 0 otherwise), 
formal education (1 if the responded attended formal schooling and 0 otherwise), work experience (1 if the respondent has prior work 
experience and 0 otherwise), and tribe (1 if Bantu and 0 otherwise). 
* correlations are significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 2: Results of IV Regression Analysis 
Variables 3SLS OLS 
Network 
size 
Shared  
identity 
Aggregate cost Resources raised Firm  
performance 
Firm  
performance 
Aggregate cost     -1.17*** -0.54*** 
     (3.43) (2.90) 
Resources raised     0.11*** 0.03 
     (2.75) (1.41) 
Industry
a
 7.77** 0.93*** -0.53 -2.72 -1.41** -1.00 
 (2.29) (3.88) (0.57) (0.42) (1.99) (1.50) 
Firm size 0.80** 0.01 0.55*** 3.86*** 0.29** 0.28*** 
 (2.40) (0.27) (7.05) (7.18) (2.22) (3.09) 
Firm age -0.59* -0.00 -0.13* -0.80 -0.05 -0.02 
 (1.71) (0.20) (1.72) (1.47) (0.61) (0.30) 
Total kin 0.21** -0.03***     
 (2.49) (4.60)     
Male
b
 6.35** -0.27     
 (2.07) (1.22)     
Marital status -0.26 0.08     
 (0.09) (0.41)     
African
c
 10.45 -0.33     
 (1.33) (0.59)     
Education 19.23*** 0.25     
 (2.94) (0.53)     
Work experience 3.99 -0.13     
 (1.50) (0.67)     
Entrepreneur’s age -0.34* -0.01     
 (1.84) (0.79)     
Parents’ bus. exp. 1.95 
(0.70) 
0.81*** 
(4.12)     
Individual income 3.55** 0.11     
 (2.16) (0.98)     
Social participation 3.58*** 0.04     
 (2.80) (0.40)     
Size of immediate fam. 3.05*** 
(9.80) 
0.05** 
(2.29)     
Tribe 1.62 -0.01     
 (0.60) (0.08)     
Network size (1)   -0.28**
d
 -1.92**
e
   
   (2.55) (2.52)   
Shared identity (2)   -3.78***
f
 -22.96**
g
   
   (2.83) (2.48)   
(1) X (2) 
  
0.08*** 
(2.71) 
0.54*** 
(2.67)   
Constant -55.71*** 4.95*** 14.44*** 80.00** 3.35*** 2.53*** 
 (4.07) (5.10) (2.84) (2.27) (4.90) (4.38) 
R-squared 0.58 0.40 0.28 0.41 0.05 0.10 
 
z-statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. n = 188. Religion dummy variables included. 
a
Garment industry=1 (0=ICT), 
b
Male=1 (0=female), 
c
African=1 (0=Asian). 
d,e,f,g
The simple main effects of these 
variables when the moderator (i.e., the variable with which it interacts) is held constant at its mean are respectively 
(z-statistics in parentheses) 
d
.04 (2.21), p < .05 ; 
e
.27 (2.20), p < .05; 
f
-.44 (1.03), p > .10; 
g
-.12 (.04), p > .10 
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Effect of network size on amount of finances raised moderated by shared identity 
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Figure 2 
Effect of network size on cost of resources moderated by shared identity 
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Note: For both figures, all covariates were held at their constant means and pooled into the 
intercept. 
